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Summary
Actions performed in a state of automatism are not subject to moral evaluation, while automatic actions often are. Is the asymmetry
between automatistic and automatic actions justified? In order to answer this question we need a model of moral accountability that does
justice to our intuitions about a range of modes of agency, both pathological and non-pathological. Our aim in this paper is to lay the
groundwork for the development of such a model.
In all of us, even in good men, there is a lawless,
wild-beast nature, which peers out in sleep.
Plato, The Republic
Introduction
In the early morning of 24 May 1987, Ken Parks
drove 23 kilometres from his home in Pickering,
Ontario to his in-law’s house. He entered the house
using the key he had brought with him, strangled his
father-in-law unconscious, and fatally stabbed his
mother-in-law. Parks then ‘came to’ and drove to a
nearby police station where he reported his actions to
the police, saying that he ‘thought he might have
killed some people’ (Broughton et al., 1994). Parks
was charged with the murder of his mother-in-law,
but acquitted on the grounds that he had committed
his horrific actions while in a state of somnambulism
(sleep-walking), and thus qualified for the defence of
automatism.
The legal defence of automatism is well estab-
lished (Fenwick, 1990; McSherry, 1998; Ridgway,
1996; Schopp, 1991), and reflects the common-
sense judgment that individuals are not fully
accountable for what they do in such states. But
although it seems clear that automatism exculpates,
it is not clear why it exculpates. What exactly is
it about Parks’s mental state that renders him
non-culpable for his actions?
In an engaging study of moral responsibility in
automatism, Robert Schopp (1991) argues that the
automaton is not responsible for what she does
because she is unaware of how the contemplated act
conflicts with her other desires, and such morally
relevant information as her self-image and her moral
beliefs. Although the automaton’s wants and beliefs
may cause her actions, they do not cause them ‘in the
manner characteristic of ordinary human activity’
(Schopp, 1991, p. 145), and as a result her actions
are not deeply attributable to her.
Schopp’s account seems promising, but it gener-
ates the following problem. In some sense there is no
such thing as ‘ordinary human activity’. Instead,
human activities involve a range of modes of agency,
from the deliberative and reflective to the automatic
and non-intentional. While the contrast between
deliberative agency and automatisms seems clear, the
contrast between automatisms and more automatic,
non-deliberative, forms of ‘ordinary human activity’
is anything but clear (indeed a number of authors
argue that automaticity is the norm for human
activity [Bargh, 1997; Bargh & Chartrand, 1999]).
And this is problematic, for although automatism
exculpates, it is less obvious that automaticity
exculpates. Consider the following vignettes:
1. A child runs out in front of Tim’s new Volvo, and
in order to avoid hitting her he drives into the
embankment, damaging his car. He does not
deliberate over what he should do; he is barely
aware of the child’s presence before he acts.
2. Janice is walking down a dark alley late at night
when she hears a cry for help. She responds
automatically, running in the direction from
which the voice seemed to come. If she had
reflected she would have chosen a less risky
course of action. But she did not: she simply
reacted to the sounds of distress.
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3. The man walking a few paces ahead of Neil drops
a fifty-dollar bill from his wallet without realizing
it. Before Neil has time to think about what he
should do, he scoops up the money and pockets
it. It seems to him that he did not decide to keep
the money. He just acted.
Although these actions are non-deliberative, we
are inclined to regard them as properly subject
to moral evaluation. We think it is appropriate to
apply what Strawson (1962) called the reactive
attitudes—attitudes such as praise and blame—to
Tim, Janice and Neil; Tim and Janice are praise-
worthy for their actions, while Neil ought to be
censured for pocketing the money that did not
belong to him. Individuals are perhaps less account-
able for these kinds of actions than for their
deliberative actions, but they seem to be accountable
for them in a way that automatons are not. Can this
common-sense judgment be justified?
In order to answer this question, we need a much
finer-grained understanding of human agency than
philosophers have typically provided. To a first
approximation, we can think of agency as taking
the following four forms:
1. Deliberative agency. We exercise deliberative
agency when we deliberate or reflect on what we
ought to do, attempting to evaluate our reasons
for action in the light of our values, convictions,
and beliefs about the world. This kind of agency
has rightly impressed philosophers—largely, we
suspect, because deliberative agency seems to be
uniquely human—but in fact only a small
proportion of our actions involve much in the
way of deliberation or reflection.
2. Conscious agency. Although non-deliberative,
much of human agency is conscious: we are
typically aware of what we are doing and why we
are doing it. Conscious agency roughly coincides
with ‘willed’, ‘controlled’ or ‘voluntary’ agency
(see e.g., Jahanshahi & Frith, 1998; Shallice,
1988; Spence, 2001b; Perner, 2003), although
none of these terms is unproblematic.
3. Automatic agency. Automatic agency involves an
absence—or at least a reduction—of the experi-
ence of doing. The paradigm of such behaviour is
the over-learned action. One is usually (fully)
conscious when performing an over-learned
action, but one is not conscious of the over-
learned action itself. The stock example here is
that of driving a car (Bargh & Chartrand, 1999;
Palmeri, 2002; Wheatley & Wegner, 2001). For
the experienced driver, driving along a familiar
road demands little in the way of attention, effort,
or monitoring. One does it automatically—as one
says—with one’s attention on other things.
4. Automatistic agency. ‘Automatism’ is a broad and
fairly vague term for a class of conditions in which
one acts without being fully conscious of what
one is doing. We think it useful to distinguish
between two kinds of automatisms: global
automatisms and local automatisms. Global
automatisms involve a global disruption of con-
sciousness; they occur in the context of somnam-
bulism, epileptic fugue, drug-related and trance
states, and temporal and frontal lobe seizures.
Individuals in these states perform fairly complex
actions in a ‘robotic’ manner. Their environmen-
tal awareness is limited, and they tend to be
amnesic for their actions (Fenwick, 1990). What
we call ‘local automatisms’, by contrast, involve
only a disruption of consciousness and control
over a particular kind of action. A person with a
local automatism is fully conscious, but they
experience no sense of agency over a particular
complex and apparently voluntary action
(Wegner, 2002). Automatic writing—in which
an agent writes but has no experience of directing
her hand—is one form of local automatism,
another is the anarchic hand syndrome, in which
a person’s hand (usually the right hand) engages
in apparently purposive behaviour over which
the agent has little or no direct control (Spence,
2001a; Spence, 2002).
Are these modes of agency discrete, clearly
differentiated states, or are they four points on a
continuum? Arguably Janice and Neil engage in
conscious (but non-deliberative) agency, but perhaps
Tim’s actions are more automatic than conscious.
Dual control accounts of agency (e.g., Norman &
Shallice, 1986; Perner, 2003) seem to assume that
the distinction between conscious and automatic
processes is a clean one, but there is little reason to
endorse this assumption. And even if conscious and
automatic processes are distinct, complex actions
involve nested hierarchies of both conscious and
automatic processes: one can be conscious of certain
high-level descriptions of an action but unconscious
of the detailed motor routines involved in imple-
menting it ( Jeannerod, 1997). The important point
for our purposes is not whether or not the divisions
between these four modes of agency are hard and
fast, but whether the differences between these
modes of agency—such as they are—also mark
differences in moral accountability. There is a
prima facie case for thinking that they do: generally
speaking, ‘premeditated’ homicide—murder ‘in cold
blood’—is worse than spur-of-the-moment killing,
which is in turn is worse than killing performed as the
result of an automatic action, which is in turn worse
than killing while in a state of automatism. Are these
judgments justified? And if so, what justifies them?
We will explore this question by examining three
respects in which these modes of agency appear to
differ: the degree to which they involve deliberation;
the degree to which they reflect or manifest the
agent’s character; and the degree to which they
involve control on the agent’s part (Levy & Bayne,
2004).
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Deliberation
How might deliberation and moral responsibility
be related? One appealingly straightforward view
is this: one is morally responsible only for instances
of unimpaired deliberative agency. This view lines
up with some of our intuitions concerning moral
accountability. It accords with our view that children
are less accountable than adults, for their deliberative
abilities are less developed. It also accords with our
attitudes to moral responsibility in the context of
insanity and psychosis. A person suffering from
psychosis might have deliberated over her actions at
length, but since her deliberative abilities are
impaired, she is not fully responsible for her actions.
This view also accords with our practice of
not holding people accountable for their automa-
tistic actions. There appears to be little room for
deliberation in automatism. Whatever exactly the
impairment of consciousness in global autom-
atism involves—whether automatistic agents are
completely unconscious; are conscious of less; or
have a kind of occluded consciousness—global
automatism offers an agent little opportunity for
deliberation. The same point applies, for different
reasons, to local automatisms. Consider the anarchic
hand syndrome. Although individuals with this
disorder engage in apparently purposive behaviour
with their anarchic hand—they reach for a cup, open
doors, and so on—these actions do not derive from
a process of deliberation; they form part of no
larger plan of action. Individuals with local auto-
matisms are capable of deliberation, but their autom-
atistic actions are not governed by the results of
these deliberations, and hence are not deliberate.
But although the view that we are accountable only
for deliberative actions may make sense of our
attitudes to automatistic actions, it does not sit
easily with a number of our other attitudes to
accountability and agency. Bernard Williams
(1982) and many other ethicists have suggested
that there are situations in which spontaneous right
action can be more praiseworthy than pre-meditated
action: a person of good character would simply see
what the appropriate thing to do is without needing
to deliberate about it. (Note that there is a puzzling
asymmetry between good action and bad action:
while it is better to perform a good action sponta-
neously than on the basis of deliberation, deliberate
wrongdoing always seems worse than spontaneous
wrongdoing). Williams’s view suggests that we can
be responsible for non-deliberative actions.
This seems right. Recall again the three cases we
introduced above. Although neither Tim, Janice, nor
Neil deliberated before they acted, we want to hold
them accountable for their actions. The mere fact
that they failed to deliberate appears not to exculpate
them. Consider the tragic case of the young father
who simply forgot to drop his infant daughter at
childcare, and instead left her to die in the parking lot
while he worked (Dennett, 2003). Though we blame
him much less for his lapse than if he had deliberately
set out to harm her, the mere fact that he neglected
to deliberate adequately appears not to excuse him of
all responsibility for his actions.
We might attempt to address this problem by
suggesting that it is not deliberation per se that is
relevant here but the opportunity to deliberate.
Perhaps we can be accountable for the exercise of
non-deliberative agency if we have had the opportu-
nity to deliberate and failed to exercise it. Arguably,
this is what happens in Neil’s case: Neil had the
opportunity to deliberate before pocketing the $50
note but he failed to take it up. But although it is
certainly true that we can be held responsible for not
deliberating, we cannot account for all our intuitions
regarding non-deliberative agency in this way. Neil is
not only accountable for not deliberating, he is also
accountable for doing what he did. (Following
Williams, we might regard it as a failing of Neil’s
that he should need to deliberate here: a good moral
agent would do the right thing without thinking
about it). A second, and perhaps more serious,
objection is that there are instances of morally
accountable non-deliberative agency in which there
is no opportunity for deliberation. Consider Tim,
who has to decide what to do when a child runs
out in front of his car. Even if Tim could have
deliberated—which is perhaps doubtful—the costs of
doing so would have been prohibitive; a rational
agent ought not to deliberate in such situations, for
by the time he has deliberated the opportunity
for effective action will have passed.
One might attempt to handle this objection by
appealing to the notion of backtracking. Perhaps our
responsibility for automatic actions tracks back to
earlier decisions—which may or at least ought to have
involved deliberation—to perform actions, which led
to these actions becoming habitual. In allowing
ourselves to inculcate a habitual action, we ought to
take into account the full range of circumstances in
which that reflex might be triggered. If we inculcate a
habit recklessly, and the reflex is triggered in a
manner that causes harm (say), we are culpable
despite the fact that we were not able to inhibit the
response or to deliberate before we acted. Our
responsibility tracks back to earlier moments when
we could deliberate and control our actions.
While it is certainly true that we can be held
accountable for recklessly developing habits and
automatic patterns of behaviour, a backtracking
account of this kind fails to deliver the general
account for which we are looking. For one thing, it is
difficult to see how it could deal with automatic
behaviours that are hardwired rather than acquired.
Tim’s action, for example, does not seem to track
back to earlier instances in which he engaged—or
failed to engage—in deliberative agency.
A final point to consider: even if deliberation—or
the opportunity for it—were to correlate perfectly
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with moral accountability, we would want to know
why this was so. One possibility is that deliberation is
important in its own right. This position seems
implausible to us. More plausible is the view that
deliberative agency (or the possibility thereof)
grounds accountability because it reflects or man-
ifests the agent’s character more fully than non-
deliberative agency. A second possibility is that
deliberation grounds accountability because it
involves a greater degree of control over one’s
actions than non-deliberative agency. We turn now
to explore these ideas.
Character
Perhaps we are responsible for an action to the extent
that it reflects our character (Reznek, 1997). Since
deliberate, pre-meditated actions reflect our char-
acter to a greater extent than non-deliberate actions,
we are more accountable for them. Deciding to
defraud one’s employer after a protracted period of
weighing up the pros and cons reflects more badly
on one’s character than seeing an opportunity for
fraud and spontaneously pursuing it.
This approach to moral accountability also seems
to make prima facie sense of our attitudes to
automatism. Automatistic actions are often out of
character. The Ken Parks case is an excellent
example of this: Parks had no history of physical
violence, and by all accounts he got on very well
with his parents-in-law. His actions seem to be
entirely out of character for him (Broughton et al.,
1994). Indeed, this seems to be true of many cases of
violence in states of automatism (see Mahowald
et al., 1990). Perhaps this explains why those
individuals who commit such acts are not responsible
for them.
But despite its prima facie appeal, the attempt to
root moral accountability in character faces prob-
lems. One problem concerns the assumption that
non-deliberative agency does not reflect one’s
character. Consider Janice, who placed herself in
some danger by running to the aid of a stranger. It
is plausible to suppose that Janice would not have
gone to the stranger’s aid if she had had time to
deliberate about her action. She might even say that
she ‘wasn’t herself ’ when she acted—she doesn’t
regard herself as the sort of person who foolishly
endangers herself in this way. But perhaps Janice is
mistaken in making such claims. Perhaps she is
wrong about the sort of person she is, and her
non-deliberative actions reflect her character more
accurately than do her considered judgments about
what she thinks she would have done if she were in
her right mind. (Of course, her considered judg-
ments about what she thinks she would have done
say something about Janice’s character—they demon-
strate that she is self-deceived in certain ways).
Allowing that our non-deliberative actions can reflect
our characters has the welcome implication that we
can discover who we are from observing our actions
(Stephens & Graham, 1996).
Although this line of thought has some appeal, it is
not clear how far we ought to take it. Consider action
in the context of dreaming—a cognitive state which
seems to resemble global automatisms in a number
of ways. St. Augustine wondered whether it is
possible to sin while dreaming. As he rightly
discerned, the answer is ‘no’, but is this because
our dream actions and behaviour fail to reflect or
manifest our characters (see Flanagan, 2000)? Janice
might find herself going to the aid of a stranger
in defiance of her own standing policy, but she
would never find herself killing someone (unless in
self-defence, or a result of a psychopathology)—
actions in which she may well engage while dream-
ing. When Janice becomes aware of her acts of dream
violence, does she learn that she really does have
violent tendencies lurking in the depths of her
unconscious, or are these actions and motives not
really attributable to her?
It might be said that we should not equate a
person’s character—their identity—with all of their
beliefs, desires and various intentional states (some
of which they might not know about). Perhaps we
should not be identified with our non-endorsed
desires and attitudes—states that we wish we didn’t
have and have attempted to expunge (Frankfurt,
1987). There is a sense in which non-endorsed states
are less our own than endorsed states—states that
reflect our all-things-considered judgments and with
which we ourselves identify (Velleman, 1992)—but
this point needs to be handled with some care, for it
is also true that denying ownership of non-endorsed
states can easily slide into a form of self-deception.
Perhaps we should regard the products of automatic
(and automatistic) agency as manifesting our char-
acters no less than the products of conscious and
deliberative agency. We return to this issue below.
Let us move now from the question of when an
action might reflect one’s character to the question of
how character and moral accountability are related.
Consider a case of global automatism in which an
agent’s actions are consonant with his character.
Suppose, contrary to fact, that Parks did have a
history of violence and aggression (see McSherry,
1998 for such a case). Would we hold such an
individual accountable for their actions? We think
not: the mere fact of automatism seems to remove—
or at least greatly diminish—an agent’s moral
accountability.
Rather than the out-of-character nature of his
actions excusing him, it may be the out-of-character
nature of his actions that gives us reason to think that
Parks lacked an important form of control over his
behaviour, and it is this lack of control that removes
Parks from the ranks of the morally accountable. The
incongruity of his actions seems to be evidence that
his behaviour was not governed or monitored by
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executive decision-making processes. On this view,
what’s really doing the moral work here is not the
link between character and agency but the link
between control and agency; character is merely a
heuristic for getting at control. Control, and not
character, might therefore be the crucial element
excusing automatistic actions.
Control
A common theme in discussion of moral responsi-
bility is that responsibility and control are closely
related (see Fischer & Ravizza, 1998). Roughly, one
is responsible for an action to the degree that it is
under one’s control. Perhaps we can account for the
differences between these modes of agency in terms
of the degree to which they involve impairments
in the agent’s control over their behaviour.
It is useful to begin here with some distinctions.
One distinction is that between personal and sub-
personal levels of control. Personal control is the kind
of control possessed by persons as such: here we
think of the agent herself as directing and guiding
her behaviour. Sub-personal control, by contrast, is
possessed by sub-personal mechanisms. It is sub-
personal control, for example, that allows one to
track unexpectedly moving targets by hand prior to
conscious awareness of the movement (Castiello,
Paulignan & Jeannerod, 1991).
It is clearly personal control that is relevant to
the discussion of moral accountability, for it is the
person—rather than their sub-personal processes—
with whom accountability rests. So if we could,
say, align conscious and deliberative agency with
personal control, and automatistic (and perhaps
automatic) agency with sub-personal control, then
we would have a tidy control-based vindication of
our common-sense intuitions. Unfortunately, life is
rarely tidy. Although few would challenge the claim
that conscious and deliberative agency involve
personal control, it is not clear that automatistic
and automatic control can be parcelled out to
sub-personal processes.
A second distinction that is useful here is the
distinction between control itself and the phenomen-
ology of control. Deliberative and conscious modes of
agency involve the feeling of doing (Wegner, 2002).
This is the sense that one is the doer of one’s deeds
and author of one’s actions. The loss of the
phenomenology of agency is a central and defining
feature of local automatisms, both induced (auto-
matic writing) and organic (the anarchic hand
syndrome). The phenomenology of agency might
also be lost in global automatisms, although it is
difficult to tell.
What is the relationship between control and the
phenomenology of control? Can the two come apart,
and if so, which is it that grounds moral account-
ability: the feeling of control or control itself ? Let’s
start with the question of whether the loss of the
phenomenology of control involves a loss of control
itself. This is a difficult question to answer in full,
but it seems clear that certain levels of control
can survive in the absence of the phenomenology
of control. Automatic writing is a case in point
here. Individuals engaged in this practice have lost
the sense of agency for what they are doing with
their writing hand, but what they are doing with the
hand is in some sense generated by their intentions,
as can be seen by comparing automatic writing
with the anarchic hand syndrome. Unlike automatic
writers, individuals with an anarchic hand describe
the hand as having a mind of its own, and are often
forced to use their good hand to hold their bad hand
down (Goldberg, Mayer & Toglia, 1981; Feinberg et
al., 1992; Banks et al., 1989).
But despite some independence between control
and the phenomenology thereof, it is plausible to
suppose that certain kinds of control depend on the
phenomenology of agency. Arguably, deliberation
demands the feeling of doing (or at least the feeling
that one can do). However, the precise nature of the
link between control itself and the phenomenology
of control remains mysterious, and without denying
the importance of the phenomenology of control for
accounts of moral responsibility we will leave it aside
for the present and focus our attention on control
itself. (It seems clear that the feeling of control
cannot by itself ground accountability, for one can
erroneously feel as though one is doing things that
are being done by someone else. Nevertheless, it may
be that the feeling of control is necessary for moral
accountability).
There seems to be a tight connection between
control and conscious and deliberative agency.
It is not for nothing that conscious processes
are often called controlled processes. While this
label might be misleading in that it suggests that
automatic processes are uncontrolled, it is certainly
true that conscious agency involves a level of control
not (typically) possessed by automatic and automa-
tistic agency. Consciousness enables us to inhibit or
veto our initial impulses to act. Absent conscious-
ness, behaviour is guided by (fairly) modular action-
routines and over-learned scripts: control is local
rather than global, and (generally) sub-personal
rather than personal.
So the notion of control provides us with a morally
relevant distinction between conscious and delibera-
tive agency, on the one hand, and automatic and
automatistic agency on the other. Does it also
provide us with a morally relevant distinction
between automatic and automatistic agency? We
think it might.
The similarities between automatic agency and
automatistic agency appear to run fairly deep, but the
differences between them are important and must
not be overlooked. Automatic agency is sensitive to
disruption and resistance in the way that automatistic
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agency is not. The disruption of automatic agency
generally leads to the resumption of conscious
control over the action. When we meet with
unexpected road conditions we switch from auto-
matic to conscious agency, and are immediately
conscious of what we are doing. Although automatic
actions are (by definition) not directly monitored,
they are indirectly monitored to the extent that the
agent remains ready to move to conscious forms of
agency should that be necessary.
In contrast, automatistic agency appears to be
resistant to disruption. There is reason to think
that aggression in automatism might be due to the
frustration of an action, which appears to be
‘essentially pre-programmed’ (Broughton et al.,
1994). Whereas the frustration of automatic agency
typically leads to the re-establishment of executive
control, the frustration of action in instances of
global automatism leaves the individual confused
and without the resources of conscious control.
Automatic agency involves a form of monitoring that
appears to be absent in global automatism.
As an aside, we can note that this line of thought
supports the parallel between global automatism
actions and normal dreaming. (Lucid dreaming
might be importantly different from normal dream-
ing here.) Automatism shares many features with
dreaming. There is reduced awareness of the
environment (greater awareness in automatism than
in ordinary dreaming, but perhaps awareness of
the environment is not entirely lacking in ordinary
dreaming consciousness), and frequently partial or
total amnesia of the dream-state upon awakening.
Somnambulism (with some rare exceptions due to
brain lesions) occurs during non-REM sleep,
which was formerly believed to be dreamless, but
which we now know to have its own characteristic
dream mentation (Flanagan, 2000). Perhaps global
automatistic actions are the product of a state of
consciousness akin to that of non-REM dreaming, in
which action plans are initiated and carried out with
little awareness of the environment and diminished
understanding of the nature and significance of the
actions.
Let us pull the various threads of this discussion
together. We suggest that automatism excuses, inter
alia, because the agent: initiates actions which she
would not normally perform; because she lacks
executive control over her actions; and because
frustration of her action-plans fails to re-establish
conscious control, as in automatic non-deliberative
action, but leaves sub-personal mechanisms in
control.
This account of responsibility for automatistic
actions combines elements of both the control and
character models of accountability. Agents who act
automatistically are not responsible for their actions
because they cannot exert the right kind of control
over their actions, where the right kind of control is
control that manifests character in a deep sense.
Those sub-personal mechanisms that initiate and
guide behaviour do not reflect the agent’s endorsed
values in such a way as to make it the case that
they are accountable for them.
To say this is not to provide a model of moral
accountability that does justice to the full range of
complex (and possibly confused) intuitions we have
about responsibility in non-deliberative agency. Such
a project is too ambitious for the present context.
Instead, we have pointed to some of the basic
components available for the construction of such
a model, and we have drawn attention to some of
the difficulties that confront one in attempting to put
these components together in a satisfactory way.
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